Apologies for the length of this post. I just couldn't stop writing.
A right-wing Australasian think-tank* called the Centre for Independent Studies has
published a report on New Zealand’s electoral system.
The authors attack MMP, and then propose replacing it with a system that adopts many of the features of First Past the Post (FPP). As a sop to concerns about FFP leading to a lack of representation for minorities and women, the report proposes an upper house elected on a proportional basis.
But the report fails on a number of levels, and its recommendations don't sound particularly sensible.
The report authors say:
The compromises that MMP encourages have led to a more consensual style of government, but it has also contributed to ad hoc lawmaking, an inability of government to take proper charge of a legislative programme, and pork barrel politics and ‘back room deals.’
It is true we have a more consensual style of government under MMP. Consensus politics have ensured we no longer see wild and sudden changes in policy direction from government to government.
MMP is a system concerned with process rather than outcomes. Although MMP has brought proportionality to parliamentary representation, it has produced political results that can hardly claim to be representative. This is because minor parties have a greater say in contentious legislation than their vote warrants. MMP was also designed to give women and ethnic groups more representation in Parliament. Maori and women’s representation has somewhat improved under MMP, but there is little or no evidence that it was MMP itself that led to this improvement.
Making a system representative of society means giving minorities a voice they never had under FPP. MMP has largely achieved this. The “somewhat" is also misplaced. Levels of representation of Maori and women have increased significantly under MMP. Co-incidence?
The report at least acknowledges that FPP was anything but perfect, even if the authors don’t think MMP is the answer.
Before adopting the current system, New Zealand had a First Past the Post (FPP) electoral system, which it had modelled on the British system. The most obvious problem with FPP was the immense amount of power invested in the cabinet, which could act as an elective dictatorship with the aid of a traditionally strong party whip system.
A new electoral system should provide for appropriate checks and balances on executive power while still making it possible to govern effectively. These are, admittedly, often contradictory goals. However, we believe MMP fails to satisfactorily deliver either.
The authors find aspects of the MMP system strange, and they cite a number of incidents as proof of this.
In the 2008 election, MPs were re-elected to Parliament and remained as representatives although they had been rejected by their own local voters.
I personally didn’t find this strange. Did others?
Former Deputy Prime Minister Dr Michael Cullen spent his tenure as Minister of Finance as a list MP without ever getting the backing of his local voters.
Again, I did not find anything weird in that.
Former leader of the opposition Dr Don Brash never attempted to stand in an election and convince an electorate to vote for him since the introduction of MMP. His political career was at the mercy of his party.
We have a strong party system, as do most democracies. I don’t know of many electorate MPs (Winston Peters and a few one-man parties excepted, such as United Future and Jim Anderton) whose political career hasn’t always been at the mercy of their party. If your party dumps you you’re generally gone, whether your system is an FPP one or an MMP one.
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters was officially not part of the government except on foreign affairs issues. He publicly opposed the New Zealand China Free Trade Agreement but travelled to Beijing to sign the treaty as the government’s representative.
Okay, I’ll agree that was something many of us struggled with at the time. But Winston has always been an enigma, even before the introduction of MMP.
The report points out that MMP creates representation anomalies. Like the Maori Party overhang. Or the fact that ACT got fewer votes than NZ First last election but got five seats to NZ First’s zero. Those are flaws with the system, because the level of representation does not reflect the proportion of votes cast for these parties. And it would be nice if someone were to find a way to fix those problems without giving every 1% loony party a chance to hold the balance of power.
The authors say:
Instead of producing a robust and considered policymaking process, the MMP system has resulted in the government having to negotiate on legislation and the process becoming more time-consuming and complex.
Yes, that is why it is called consensus politics. The report’s authors appear not to understand the concept. A strong government is not always a good government. Remember the days of Muldoon? Or the fourth Labour government? In the days of FPP a party with less than 40% of the total vote could drive through anything it wanted. Now you need the support of 50% plus to get anything done. I have not heard a compelling argument why that is a bad thing, and the report’s authors fail to deliver one.
The report takes the view that list MPs merely toe the party line, and that while there may be a diversity of representation in Parliament, there is not a diversity of views. That may be the case within individual parties, but the diversity of views comes from the number of parties now in Parliament. Before MMP we were lucky if we had three parties represented. Since the introduction of MMP we’ve often had 7-8 parties in the house. And under our system of tight party discipline there has never been a tradition of MPs crossing the floor. Indeed, when an MP under FPP crossed the floor (remember Marilyn Waring?) it often precipitated a political crisis.
Having thus criticised the system for putting a brake on effective government, the authors of the report then recommend an upper house!
Any discussion of reforming the democratic process in New Zealand should focus on MMP and bicameralism, i.e. whether New Zealand would benefit from having a second house of Parliament.
The report’s authors also appear to have misread the current political landscape.
MMP initially offered a wide range of different parties, a number of whom were open to coalition partners from either side of the house. Over time, however, these parties have shrunk, and parties with similar political goals have gravitated towards each other. There are now two opposing blocs. The ‘left wing’ consists of the Labour Party, the Greens, and Progressives; the ‘right wing’ includes the National Party and the ACT Party. Of the others, NZ First is no longer represented in Parliament, and United Future is down to just one MP with an electorate seat. At the time of writing, the parliamentary future of the minor parties (Progressives, United Future, ACT, and NZ First) looked uncertain and grim.
There are two blocs – the Government and its support parties, and those in opposition. How could it be otherwise? But even within the opposition parties work still goes on in concert with National. For example, the Greens recently signed an agreement to work with National on some issues. And what of the Maori Party? Where do they sit? On some issues they are of the left, and on other issues on the right. Nor do I see any particular challenges to the existence of ACT (Rodney Hide will probably continue to hold Epsom), or United Future (Peter Dunne seems to have the ability to weather everything).
The report’s authors argue that FPP was in fact more representative:
Under FPP, the seats in Parliament did not reflect the national vote. However, the effective two-party system forced both parties to gravitate towards the centre. This way, political outcomes came close to representing the median voter’s preferences, and so it could be argued that FPP actually achieved a quasi-representative outcome.
Under MMP, a majority party enters into an agreement with one or more smaller parties after an election. So despite a Parliament being completely representative of the electorate, the actual policies tend to move further from the policy preferences of the average voter.
The reason we dumped FPP was the disgust many felt for political parties that professed to be of the centre, while pursuing radical policies. Take Labour in the ‘80s or National in the ‘90s. They were hardly parties of the centre, and the sense of betrayal the public felt over their performance led directly to the implementation of MMP.
So being more representative in theory means nothing if the party claiming to represent you has no checks on its ability to pursue an altogether different agenda.
And another thing to consider is that the governing party under MMP will look to align itself with a minority party that shares some of its values. As with the National-ACT arrangement, it may sometimes seem at times that the tail is wagging the dog, but if ACT really had its hands on power it would be selling off every asset that moved, slashing taxes and introducing competition into every aspect of the state's operations. We haven’t seen that.
So the report's analysis doesn’t bear much scrutiny.
Supposedly under FPP we’re more likely to get what we want from the parties we vote for.
In addition to this move away from the median voter, political outcomes also become less predictable. In a two-party FPP system, the winning party gets to implement its manifesto and can be held accountable for its promises. Under MMP, political results depend on negotiations between governing parties. What a voter eventually gets from a party may be quite different from what the party initially promised, cancelling the idea of representation of voter preferences.
But under FPP we didn’t get what we wanted. That is why the majority voted for a change in 1993.
The authors rely on materials published by the Business Roundtable to identify flaws in MMP. Not surprisingly the Business Roundtable is opposed to MMP, and many of its members led the fight against the introduction of it in 1993. Most of the Business Roundtable’s objections don’t stand close scrutiny, as they are based on untested and unproven assumptions about what is good for the markets and the economy. If MMP is bad for business, where is the evidence of a general downturn in the economy's performance since 1996?
The authors then argue that list MPs under MMP lack the status of electorate MPs.
In terms of legitimacy and understanding of MMP, there is still ‘a continuing perception that list MPs lack the status of their constituency colleagues,’ suggesting that the public are unsure about the role of list MPs and, consequently, do not value them as highly as their directly elected colleagues.
I’m not convinced this is an issue, or if this is an issue, that it is a major one for most people. I’m sure Michael Cullen would have been surprised to learn he lacked status in the last Parliament.
The authors reject that Parliament under FPP was not as representative of society as under MMP. But if you look at the make-up of Parliament today, compared with 20 years ago, it’s pretty obvious there have been massive changes in the rates of representation of women and minorities. Indeed, the authors use statistics to show that rates of representation have increased, but try to argue the opposite. It is also interesting that the 2008 election results were not taken into account by the authors. 2008 saw a number of MPs elected from the Pacific and Asian communities.
The proposals for an upper house reveal muddled thinking, and an overwhelming desire to ditch MMP in favour of something else, anything else. The authors know FPP won’t be tolerated, so they concoct a batty system involving a lower house with 79 electorate MPs and no list MPs, and with an upper house with 31 MPs elected on a proportional basis. Of course, the Maori seats go.
The authors assume that an upper house would provide a check on the powers of the government, ensuring that the worst aspects of FPP were avoided. And the proportionality of the upper house would enable minorities to be elected to Parliament. But there are a number of flaws with this analysis. The powers of the upper house would be limited. The upper house would only able to review legislation, rather than introduce it, and so most of the important legislative decisions would be made by a lower house elected on a FPP basis. That lower house would inevitably be much less representative of women and minorities.
I don’t see a compelling argument for any kind of upper house. We might not always like the deals done under MMP, but at least the house is more representative and parties talk to each other. We no longer have three-year dictatorships.
There's no question that MMP could be improved. But none of the arguments expressed by the report’s authors are particularly convincing.
* the words “right wing” are probably redundant. When are think-tanks ever left wing?
